

**BEFORE A HEARINGS PANEL APPOINTED BY THE  
HUTT CITY COUNCIL**

**IN THE MATTER** of the Resource Management Act  
1991 (“the Act” or “the RMA”)

**AND**

**IN THE MATTER** of the submissions of Z Energy Ltd,  
BP Oil NZ Ltd and Mobil Oil NZ Ltd  
(*the Fuel Companies*) on the  
Proposed Hutt City District Plan

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**STATEMENT OF Matthew James TINNELLY for  
Z ENERGY LTD, MOBIL OIL NZ LTD, BP OIL NZ LTD (THE FUEL COMPANIES)  
(S471, S468, FS32)**

**26 May 2026**

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## **1 Introduction**

- 1.1 I am Engineering Manager and Technical Authority for Z Energy Limited (Z) and have responsibility for the design and operational engineering standards and practices for Z across the entire business.
- 1.2 I hold a Bachelor of Engineering (Mechatronics) from Massey University, a Master of Science (Engineering and Management) from the University of Portsmouth UK, a Master of Business Administration (University of Otago). I am accredited as a Chartered Engineer by the United Kingdom Engineering Council, and am a Chartered Professional Engineer with Engineers Australia, holding registration in Queensland (RPEQ), and Victoria (CAV), as well as being an APEC-Accredited International Professional Engineer. I am a fellow of the Institute of Marine Engineering, Science and Technology, and a Fellow of Engineers Australia.
- 1.3 I have over 26 years' experience as an engineer, with 13 years' direct experience in the Oil and Gas Industry. I have worked for Z Energy for the past 8 years.
- 1.4 This evidence has been prepared to respond to operational issues raised by Seaview Marina Limited in the planning evidence of Alice Blackwell, the technical evidence of Robert van de Munckhof, and the corporate evidence from the Marina CEO, Tim Lidgard. This includes:
- Role of Terminals
  - Best practice controls
  - Whether Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) reports have been updated
  - Whether Seaview Terminal is applying best practice controls
  - Why the Oil Companies are seeking a more conservative approach to manage risk, both for the terminal and the pipelines (Wharflines)

## **2 Terminals**

- 2.1 Each Bulk Storage Terminal (BST) at Seaview is critical supply chain infrastructure for New Zealand's energy supply, and for the Wellington region, as well as the lower North Island. The role of the terminals is to receive, store, then provide offtake facilities to enable distribution of liquid hydrocarbons in the form of Automotive Gas Oil (AGO) or Diesel, Jet Fuel, and the grades of Motorspirit (Petrol) used in New Zealand including (but not limited to) 91 Octane, 95 Octane, and 98 and 100 Octanes.

- 2.2 The BSTs are a critical element in the fuel supply chain, enabling the efficient and safe storage of hydrocarbons. The bulk storage aspect enables supply chain efficiencies, and thereby lower costs to customers through the ability to import, and store (prior to distribution) in bulk. Each terminal is, by its own right, regionally significant to the owner-company, but additionally to those wholesale customers that it services (for example retail-only fuel sites, or large contracting companies), but also in times of emergency where access to site(s) is necessary to provide liquid fuel to essential services.
- 2.3 The BSTs also hold critical importance within Civil Defence Emergency Management frameworks, being classified as 'Lifeline Assets'. This designation requires that when emergency management protocols are enacted, the sites must be capable of issuing fuel to maintain critical services. Examples of this include during the COVID pandemic, and more recently during Cyclone Gabrielle, when the Z owned site in Napier provided fuel to several key services and sites.
- 2.4 There are four BST sites within Seaview – two directly adjacent to the marina, and two more at around 750m (Z) and 1000m (NZOSL Operated Hutt City Terminal).
- 2.5 At each of the four sites, hydrocarbons are stored in tanks that range in capacity from 100,000 litres to 8,500,000 litres. These tanks are all constructed in accordance with the American Petroleum Institute (API) standards and regularly inspected as part of this. The tanks sit within containment bunds – intended to prevent any loss of containment to the environment – and are spaced at distances that reflect the type of hydrocarbon they hold, the firefighting system(s) fitted, and location relative to external assets, facilities, or otherwise.
- 2.6 Fuel is received into each of the BST's at Seaview, from tanker ships berthed at the end of the fuel wharf located at Point Howard. The fuel is then transferred via the 'Hutt City Wharf Line (HCWL)', a DN 350 pipeline that runs from the end of the wharf to each of the terminals. Pumps onboard the tanker ships provide pressure for this.
- 2.7 Fuel is then distributed from the BST's by road tanker. Tankers are filled at the Tanker Truck Loading Rack (TTLR) at each site. The TTLR's at the BSTs in Seaview are, as a minimum, 'two bay', meaning two tankers can load simultaneously.
- 2.8 Fuels are distributed throughout the Wellington region and the Lower North Island. Resilience of BST storage supply and infrastructure is therefore critical to several regions.

### **3 WorkSafe Designation of Terminals as MHF**

- 3.1 Three of the BST's at Seaview are designated as Major Hazard Facilities under the Health and Safety at Work (Major Hazard Facilities) Regulations 2016 (the **regulations**). This is determined by the quantity of flammable products (Jet Fuel, AvGas or Petrol's) held in storage on the site. The three sites that are designated as MHF's (Z Seaview, Mobil Seaview, and NZOSL Hutt City) are all considered Lower Tier given the flammable product quantities held.
- 3.2 While these sites are designated as Lower Tier, it is important to note that fuels BSTs present a high-consequence hazard due to the large inventories of flammable and combustible liquids stored on site, often in the order of tens to hundreds of millions of litres. Although classified as Lower Tier Major Hazard Facilities, this reflects regulatory thresholds rather than inherently low risk. The scale of stored hydrocarbons means that a loss of containment, if ignited, can result in significant thermal radiation and escalation, with risk driven primarily by the magnitude of potential consequences.
- 3.3 In recognition of these hazards, operators of Lower Tier Major Hazard Facilities in New Zealand (and including at Seaview) are required under the regulations to systematically identify and assess major accident risks and to implement controls to reduce those risks so far as is reasonably practicable (SFAIRP). This includes undertaking a formal safety assessment, maintaining an effective emergency plan for credible worst-case scenarios, and ensuring that critical controls are in place, tested, and sustained. Together, these obligations are intended to ensure that, despite the scale of potential consequences, risks are actively managed and emergency preparedness is robust.
- 3.4 These regulations do not control land use adjacent to or near MHF/BSTs. However, WorkSafe – as the regulator – can, and does, from time-to-time, review site designations. This can be prompted by a recognised change in the event of increased risk, including for example a more sensitive receiving environment because of changes in neighbouring land uses. Any change in designation to Upper Tier would require a site-specific Safety Case to be prepared which may result in additional requirements regarding managing adjacent activities through zoning and the like.
- 3.5 Best-practice controls for fuel BSTs, reflecting lessons from the Buncefield incident, and emphasise the prevention of overfill and loss of containment through multiple, independent layers of protection. This includes robust primary level measurement systems, high-integrity independent high-level shutdown systems (meeting appropriate SIL targets), and effective alarm management that ensures timely operator response. Additional controls include rigorous maintenance and proof

testing of safety-critical equipment, engineered containment such as bunding designed for credible worst-case events, and vapour cloud explosion mitigation strategies. Buncefield also highlighted the importance of strong management systems – covering competence, procedures, and verification of critical controls – as well as comprehensive emergency planning aligned to large-scale, multi-tank fire and vapour cloud scenarios - all of which are in place across industry sites including the Seaview BSTs.

- 3.6 While the physical footprint of the Bulk Storage Tanks (BSTs) has remained largely unchanged for several years, the composition and ratio of products stored varies in response to demand. As a result, the associated risk contours are not static and may change over time. The ability to increase or reconfigure storage capacity is therefore critical to maintaining the effectiveness and resilience of the supply chain. In the current environment of global supply chain pressure, fuel companies are actively assessing the viability of upgrading or enhancing existing infrastructure to meet evolving demand and operational requirements.
- 3.7 Given the significant cost and practical constraints associated with developing new facilities, such upgrades are typically undertaken within the existing terminal footprint. Accordingly, land use in proximity to the BSTs should recognise this operational reality and avoid imposing unnecessary constraints on the ability to expand or optimise existing infrastructure.

#### **4 Wharfline**

- 4.1 A joint-industry pipeline (the HCWL) connects Seaview Wharf to the four bulk fuel terminals, distributing imported product via a shared asset arrangement. The system has undergone a staged upgrade under the Seaview resilience project, with earlier sections already replaced and the final onshore stage (new offtake and manifold configuration) currently under construction and due for completion in 2026. The primary drivers for upgrade include improving seismic resilience – particularly addressing weaknesses in legacy collar-welded joints and wharf movement – as well as rerouting sections of the pipeline to avoid sensitive land uses such as the Kokiri Marae. The global cost of this infrastructure project is in the order of \$55 Million dollars.
- 4.2 Fuel shipments are received at Seaview Wharf via tankers and discharged through the pipeline to the terminals in a controlled, continuous transfer process that minimises handling and exposure. Operations are subject to berth and infrastructure constraints, including limits associated with wharf condition and the need to coordinate vessel discharge durations with terminal capacity and pipeline operating conditions. The pipeline comprises both above ground and buried sections, with

newer works including subsea installation to improve resilience. The Wharfline is operated in accordance with AS2885 with controls such as pressure limitations, inspection and maintenance regimes, and planned intelligent pigging to verify integrity over time.

- 4.3 The Wharfline is in use 1-2 times per week, for periods of up to 48 hours while multi-grade discharges occur. As this depends on operational factors, including shipping availability, it is not generally practicable to provide prior-warning to neighbouring sites such as the Seaview Marina of intended use times.

## **5 Development near pressure pipelines**

- 5.1 Development in proximity to pressurised hydrocarbon pipelines introduces a credible risk of third-party interference, which is recognised as one of the primary threats to pipeline integrity under AS 2885. Activities such as excavation, piling, drilling, or installation of services can result in coating damage, denting, or rupture of the pipeline if not adequately controlled; relatively minor mechanical damage can create stress concentrations that increase the likelihood of delayed failure under operating pressure – as was evidenced from the Refinery-Auckland Pipeline (RAP) incident in 2017. Accordingly, AS 2885 recommends formal controls around encroachment, including defined easements, permitting systems for ground disturbance, and clear identification of the pipeline location to prevent inadvertent strikes.

- 5.2 AS 2885 establishes a risk-based framework that explicitly considers surrounding land use through the concept of Location Class and measurement length. Changes in land use – such as increased population density, introduction of sensitive receptors (e.g. schools, marae), or commercial development – can elevate the consequence of a pipeline failure and trigger a requirement for reassessment of risk. Where risk exceeds acceptable levels, additional controls must be assessed and – where practicable – implemented (e.g. increased depth of cover, physical protection, pressure reduction, or rerouting), or the land use itself may be restricted. The standard therefore creates a dynamic obligation on pipeline operators to reassess and manage risk in response to encroachment, ensuring that societal risk remains as low as reasonably practicable over the life of the asset.

- 5.3 The ability to implement operational constraints suggested by Council & Seaview Marina Ltd; response to comment from S42A author (para 303):

*‘the extent to which the pipeline’s risk profile could be reduced through feasible changes to operation or management, such as changes to operating pressure, throughput, product scheduling, physical protection, monitoring, or other safety measures;’*

The nature of shipping schedules, but especially the significant costs associated with vessel demurrage mean that delays to discharge operations will incur large costs – as an example, a single day’s demurrage charge can range from \$30,000 USD to \$60,000 USD dependant on supply chain, alternative vessel availability, and charter-party agreements. Delays in being able to commence discharge operations, or even the prolonging of the discharge through the lowering pressure (and thereby flowrate), would all result in these costs being incurred.

## **6 QRAs undertaken to date and why/how commissioned**

6.1 Quantitative Risk Assessments (QRAs) for each site are undertaken in accordance with the operating company’s own policies, procedures, and applicable process safety frameworks. I cannot comment on the specific practices adopted by other fuel companies, however, in the case of Z Energy, QRAs are typically conducted on a 10-year cycle, with interim reviews undertaken at approximately five-year intervals, or earlier where required, to ensure that any material changes in the risk profile are appropriately identified and addressed.

6.2 A QRA is complementary to the broader process safety risk assessment framework and is primarily used to quantify risks external to the facility boundary. More detailed and operationally focused risk assessment tools are applied to manage risks within the Bulk Storage Tank (BST) banded area.

6.3 Risk contours derived from QRAs are typically communicated to relevant stakeholders to inform decision-making regarding adjacent land use. This approach has been applied at Wiri Oil Services Limited (WOSL) in Auckland, where a two-tiered risk framework has been adopted and reflected in the site’s Emergency Management Plans. A copy of the relevant section of the Auckland Unitary Plan (chapter E29) is provided in support.

6.4 Typically, QRA’s are not undertaken for pipelines, instead AS2885 requires that a Safety Management Study (SMS) occurs every 5 years, and on occasion where the risk profile to the pipeline, or operating condition of the pipeline has changed (as set down in AS 2885). The most recent SMS for the HCWL was completed in late 2025 and will be updated on completion of the final section being renewed later this year.

## **7 Conclusion**

7.1 The Seaview Bulk Storage Terminals (BSTs) and associated wharflines infrastructure are critical lifeline assets that underpin the reliable supply of fuel to the Wellington region and the wider lower North Island. These facilities inherently present high-consequence hazards due to the scale of hydrocarbons stored and transferred; however, those risks are well characterised and are rigorously managed through a

mature regulatory framework, the application of recognised standards (including AS/NZS 2885), and multiple, independent layers of engineered and procedural controls consistent with established international best practice.

- 7.2 Quantitative Risk Assessments (QRAs) are a key component of this framework, specifically in relation to understanding and managing offsite risk. The evidence is clear that risk contours derived from QRAs are not static; they change over time in response to operational factors such as product mix, storage configuration, and throughput. Land-use planning must recognise and respond to the dynamic nature of risk, including the need for periodic reassessment and adaptation.
- 7.3 Equally, the evidence demonstrates that the ongoing safe and effective operation of these facilities depends on the ability to maintain, upgrade, and optimise infrastructure within existing terminal footprints. The establishment of new bulk fuel infrastructure is highly constrained by cost, consenting complexity, and practical feasibility. As a result, upgrades and reconfiguration of existing assets are not optional – they are an essential and expected component of responsible asset stewardship and supply chain resilience, particularly in the current global operating environment.
- 7.4 There is a direct and material relationship between adjacent land use and the ability of operators to manage risk so far as is reasonably practicable (SFAIRP). Uncontrolled encroachment, intensification of sensitive activities, or planning provisions that constrain operational flexibility will increase risk exposure, reduce the effectiveness of established control frameworks, and may trigger more onerous regulatory requirements.
- 7.5 Accordingly, a conservative and precautionary approach to land-use planning in the vicinity of the Seaview terminals and wharflines is not only justified, but necessary. Such an approach must both recognise the dynamic nature of QRA-derived risk contours and preserve the ability for operators to upgrade and adapt infrastructure over time. Failure to do so would materially compromise both risk management outcomes and the resilience of critical fuel supply infrastructure.
- 7.6 For these reasons, the planning provisions and recommendations advanced by Jenny Polich and Georgina McPherson are supported. These measures are necessary and appropriate to ensure that risks are maintained SFAIRP, while safeguarding both the ongoing operation and future adaptability of this nationally significant infrastructure.

**Attachment:** Auckland Unitary Plan – Chapter E29 Emergency management area – Hazardous facilities and infrastructure

## **E29. Emergency management area – Hazardous facilities and infrastructure**

### **E29.1. Background**

For the purposes of this section, the identified hazardous facilities and infrastructure are the Wiri Oil Terminal, Wiri LPG Depot and the high pressure Refinery to Auckland petroleum pipeline.

This section provides a framework to manage the risk of adverse effects on activities located in proximity to existing hazardous facilities and infrastructure.

Hazardous facilities and infrastructure pose a risk to surrounding land uses and can result in emergency events. These are events of low probability but high potential harm to people and damage to property. They may include vapour cloud explosions, large fires or the release of toxic gas which could cause blast overpressure, fragments, heat radiation or poisoning.

Restricting or managing the encroachment of land uses in proximity of certain existing hazardous facilities and infrastructure may be necessary to ensure that risk to those land uses is appropriately managed. This is also to ensure that the operation and potential expansion of the facilities and infrastructure is not compromised by surrounding incompatible or conflicting land uses. Incompatible activities may create a lower threshold of acceptable risk in the receiving environment and generate reverse sensitivity effects. Some of these hazardous facilities and infrastructure are critical to the functioning of Auckland and New Zealand.

The provisions for emergency management areas have two related elements that may be relevant to the activity:

- an inner emergency management area applies to the area closest to the facility, and is subject to the greatest potential effects from emergency events. In addition to the preparation of emergency management plans, building design elements must be considered for all buildings within this area; and
- a Wider Emergency Management Area applies to an area around the inner emergency management area, which requires the preparation of emergency management plans to ensure that activities operating within proximity of the hazardous facilities and infrastructure are aware of the risks and are suitably prepared.

The emergency management areas also restrict sensitive activities or incompatible land uses, including those generating high populations of people.

Sensitive activities contain people intensive activities, or those containing vulnerable populations that would require a greater level of assistance in the case of an emergency scenario, which are defined as “activities sensitive to hazardous facilities and infrastructure”.

### **E29.2. Objectives [rcp/dp]**

- (1) Activities sensitive to hazardous facilities and infrastructure are avoided in emergency management areas.
- (2) The use and development of identified hazardous facilities and infrastructure are not unreasonably constrained by the establishment or expansion of sensitive and incompatible activities.
- (3) The risk to activities in proximity to identified hazardous facilities and infrastructure is at a level acceptable to those types of activities.

### **E29.3. Policies [rcp/dp]**

- (1) Identify emergency management areas around hazardous facilities and infrastructure where this is justified on the basis of a quantitative risk assessment.
- (2) Manage the risk to activities within the emergency management area for the Wiri Oil Terminal and the Wiri LPG Depot to acceptable levels and manage reverse sensitivity effects on the development and operation of the Wiri Oil Terminal and Wiri LPG Depot by:
  - (a) avoiding the establishment or expansion of activities sensitive to hazardous facilities and infrastructure; and
  - (b) limiting the establishment or expansion of incompatible activities; and
  - (c) requiring the preparation and implementation of a site emergency management plan; and
  - (d) requiring buildings within the Inner Emergency Management Area to consider how layout reduces risk of harm to people from an emergency event.
- (3) Consider the risk to activities sensitive to hazardous facilities and infrastructure within 34 metres of the boundary of designations 6500 and 6501 (Petroleum Pipeline) where the pipeline is constructed to a “thin wall” specification.

### **E29.4. Activity table**

Table E29.4.1 Activity table specifies the activity status of land use and development activities located within the emergency management areas for the Wiri Oil Terminal shown in Figure E29.6.1 and Figure E29.6.2 and the Wiri LPG Depot shown in Figure E29.6.3 pursuant to section 9(3) of the Resource Management Act 1991.

Table E29.4.1 and Standard E29.6.1 do not apply to the high pressure Refinery to Auckland petroleum pipeline, only Policy E29.3(3) and Rule E29.5(1) apply.

Where more than one Auckland-wide or zone rule applies to the same activity, then the most restrictive status applies.

**Table E29.4.1 Activity table**

<b>Activity</b>		<b>Activity status</b>
(A1)	Activities sensitive to hazardous facilities and infrastructure	Pr
(A2)	Activities not otherwise permitted in the Business – Heavy Industry Zone (except Emergency Services within the Business – Heavy Industry Zone)	NC
<b>Development</b>		
(A3)	New buildings within the Inner Emergency Management Area for the Wiri Oil Terminal (Figure E29.6.2) or Wiri LPG Depot (Figure E29.6.3)	C
(A4)	Alterations to buildings that increase the building platform area or building height within the Inner Emergency Management Area for the Wiri Oil Terminal (Figure E29.6.2) or Wiri LPG Depot (Figure E29.6.3)	C

**E29.5. Notification**

- (1) Any application for resource consent for an activity sensitive to hazardous facilities and infrastructure (including controlled activities) located within 34m of the boundary of designations 6500 and 6501 (Petroleum Pipeline) where the pipeline is constructed to a “thin wall” specification will be subject to the normal tests for notification under the relevant sections of the Resource Management Act 1991.
- (2) Any application for resource consent for an activity including controlled activities listed in Table E29.4.1 Activity table will be subject to the normal tests for notification under the relevant sections of the Resource Management Act 1991.
- (3) When deciding who is an affected person in relation to any activity for the purposes of section 95E of the Resource Management Act 1991 the Council will give specific consideration to those persons listed in Rule [C1.13\(4\)](#) and including any person operating within the inner emergency management area.

**E29.6. Standards**

The following standards apply to all activities located within the wider emergency management area for the Wiri Oil Terminal shown in Figure E29.6.1 and the Wiri LPG Depot shown in Figure E29.6.3.

**E29.6.1. Site Emergency Management Plan**

- (1) A Site Emergency Management Plan must either be prepared and completed in accordance with the template set out E29.9.1 Site Emergency Management Plan template (non-statutory) or otherwise prepared and completed by a suitably qualified expert (for example a fire safety engineer).

- (2) The Site Emergency Management Plan must be implemented and submitted to Council at least 10 working days prior to the proposed date of commencing any new activity or any change of activity.

**Figure E29.6.1 Wider Emergency Management Area for the Wiri Oil Terminal**






Figure E29.6.2 Inner Emergency Management Area for the Wiri Oil Terminal



**Figure E29.6.3 Wider Emergency Management Area and the Inner Emergency Management Area for the Wiri LPG Depot**



## **E29.7. Assessment – controlled activities**

### **E29.7.1. Matters of control**

The Council will reserve its control to all of the following matters when assessing a controlled activity resource consent application:

- (1) new buildings and alterations to buildings that increase the building platform area or building height within the Inner Emergency Management Area for the Wiri Oil Terminal (Figure E29.6.2) or Wiri LPG Depot (Figure E29.6.3):
  - (a) building layout and mitigation measures for risk management purposes.

### **E29.7.2. Assessment criteria**

The Council will consider the relevant assessment criteria below for controlled activities:

- (1) new buildings and alterations to buildings that increase the building platform area or building height within the Inner Emergency Management Area for the Wiri Oil Terminal (Figure E29.6.2) or Wiri LPG Depot (Figure E29.6.3):
  - (a) the extent to which the design of buildings or alterations to buildings ensures the safety of occupants from an emergency event at the hazardous facility. The following design matters should be considered:
    - (i) layout of the buildings on the site (including the orientation of main building entrances) should maximise the separation of higher occupancy areas (such as offices) from the hazardous facility;
    - (ii) the location of glazing in relation to the hazardous facility. Where it is not practicable to locate windows away from the hazardous facility, consideration should be given to mitigation measures (such as strengthened glass / protective films) to reduce risk of harm to people; and
    - (iii) the location of the emergency egress points to facilitate movement away from the hazard (noting that fire egress doors may still be required on the side of buildings facing the hazardous facility to meet building code requirements).
  - (b) to ensure that operators of hazardous facilities are made aware of proximate activities and potential reverse sensitivity effects, whether the application includes evidence of consultation with the operator of the hazardous facility, including:
    - (i) a copy of the application to the operator 10 working days prior to lodgement of the application with the Council;
    - (ii) details of the nature of the activities in the building or alteration;
    - (iii) details of the number of staff; and
    - (iv) details of the hours of operation.

**E29.8. Assessment – restricted discretionary activities**

**E29.8.1. Matters of discretion**

The Council will reserve its discretion to all of the following matters when assessing a restricted discretionary resource consent application:

- (1) any activity that does not comply with Standard E29.6.1:
  - (a) the nature and extent of emergency management planning.

**E29.8.2. Assessment criteria**

The Council will consider the relevant assessment criteria below for restricted discretionary activities:

- (1) any activity that does not comply with Standard E29.6.1:
  - (a) refer to Policy E29.3(2).

**E29.9. Special information requirements**

There are no special information requirements in this section.

**E29.10. Site Emergency Management Plan Template (non-statutory)**

Name/Address		
Contact details	Phone Email Website	Fax
Emergency contacts	Name Role Phone	Mobile
	Name Role Phone	Mobile
Contact details of Hazardous Facility / Facilities	Name Role Phone	Mobile
	Name Role Phone	Mobile
Date Plan provided to Auckland Council		
Date copy of Plan provided to Hazardous Facility Operator/s		

Date last updated and reprinted	
Date updated Plan provided to Auckland Council	
Date updated Plan provided to Hazardous Facility Operator/s	

**Note 1**

For the purposes of this Emergency Management Plan the term ‘Hazardous Facility’ means (delete any not relevant):

- Wiri Oil Terminal
- Wiri LPG Depot

**(1) Purpose**

This plan applies in addition to [name of organisation's] own building evacuation plan which addresses incidents arising from its own operations.

This plan outlines how [name of organisation] will respond to a potential emergency arising from the Hazardous Facility and thereby partly satisfies the requirements and obligations of the Resource Management Act 1991 and health and safety legislation. Located within the Hazardous Facility Emergency Management Area, the [name of the organisation] is in a location where it may be subject to such emergency scenarios.

The key hazard at the Hazardous Facility is the storage and handling of large quantities of flammable and combustible materials. There are two particular potential emergency scenarios that could occur at the Hazardous Facility with the potential to impact offsite areas:

- flammable vapour cloud with the risk of ignition and explosion; and
- hazardous substances fire (e.g. tank or bund fire at the Wiri Oil Terminal or LPG fire at the Wiri LPG Depot).

**(2) Site plan**

A copy of site plan showing location of on-site and off-site safe assembly areas and outside evacuation routes (to be attached as Appendix A).

Safe assembly areas and evacuation routes have been selected and meet the following criteria:

- designated off-site assembly area as far as reasonably practicable from the Hazardous Facility e.g. a minimum of 400 metres from Wiri Oil Terminal site boundary or outside the Inner Emergency Management Area of the Wiri LPG Depot;

- the exits and outdoor evacuation routes avoid cul-de-sacs and routes that take any person closer to the Hazardous Facility. The route(s) lead away from the Hazardous Facility;
- exit points to be used should be as far away from the Hazardous Facility as possible;
- avoid assembly area being adjacent to large areas of glazing; and
- assembly area is preferably in an open area and or removed or remote from buildings.

**(3) Notification (relevant only in relation to the Wiri Oil Terminal)**

Wiri Oil Terminal provides a warning/notification system in the event of an emergency scenario arising at the Wiri Oil Terminal. The [name of the organisation] will facilitate and enable the notification system to be implemented on site. Although mitigation and warning systems are in place at the Terminal, catastrophic failure of systems can never be ruled out and there may be little or no prior warning.

**(4) Response actions (as appropriate):**

- Receive notification of incident from the Hazardous Facility or emergency services.
- Avoid operating any electrical switches, including lights, alarms or any other electrical appliances and systems.
- Leave immediately by the nearest safe exit route away from the Hazardous Facility.
- Evacuate on foot in a direction away from the Hazardous Facility to the assembly area.
- Do not rubberneck.
- Do not operate a vehicle.
- Report to the off-site safe-assembly area and building wardens to reconcile staff and visitor / customer names and numbers.
- Do not leave the assembly area or re-enter the building until advised it is safe to do so by the Fire Service.

**(5) Plan testing and evaluation**

- Practise relevant drills such as evacuation simulations.
- Take part in scheduled Hazardous Facility emergency exercise as requested.
- Fully document all exercises undertaken.
- Address any difficulties and problems encountered during exercises and update Plan as required.

**(6) Plan review and updating**

Review and update the Plan at least annually and following any change in circumstances

(e.g. physical changes to building or on site activities, exits or routes or personnel).

**(7) Attach Site Plan**